Introduction
Legal personality is generally understood as the capability to be -in traditional anthropomorphic terms -'the bearer of legal rights and obligations'. The concept is often linked to the philosophy of the persona, and comprises the element of 'juridical will'.
Legal personality is a structuring tool in legal systems, not least that of international law, as it indicates which actors or entities participate (have the capacity to engage in legal relations). From a systemic perspective, the prime interests are protection and accountability of actors and, at a more abstract level, stability of the legal system. 1 Used mostly (as in this chapter) interchangeably with 'subject of law', 'legal personality' is the plate-mark that accords legal existence. Hence it is a site for political struggle in both thought and practice: '[t] he concept is the foundation […] of all legal ideology.' 2 To have 'personality' in international law (ILP) means inclusion in the international legal system as an actor, it means being subject to the law and having the right to use it. To be denied ILP means to be excluded, with ensuing deprivation of instruments such as rightsholdership, capacity to conclude treaties, ius standi, and legal responsibility -but it may also mean freedom from normative constraints. As history demonstrates, inclusion in the law may bring emancipation as well as domination.
1 Fleur Johns points out how "…doctrines of personality function to ensure the durability and stability of international legal obligations over time" (Introduction in: Fleur Johns (ed), International Legal Personality, Ashgate, 2010), at xxiii) 2 Roger Cotterrell, Sociology of Law (1992) , at 123. Personality developed into a fundamental concept of international law only during the Sattelzeit. 3 As such, the idea of international legal personality became the locus of political claims and counter-claims during the twentieth century, of for example colonies, mandate territories and individuals. Today, the struggle of inclusion and exclusion focuses on non-state entities ranging from IOs and NGOs to different selfidentified groups, to multinational corporations (MNCs), cities, robots, animals and ecosystems.
This chapter considers 'legal personality' in two different roles, which are mutually constitutive. The concept works as an epistemic tool in theoretical reflections on the workings of international law, while at the same time it denotes a doctrinal category within the system of international law. We take into account both functions, with a concomitant shifting between levels of analysis, looking also at the actual candidates for international legal personality which over time have emerged in different political contexts. The chapter discusses a sequence of moments in the development of the form and use of the concept that we consider especially significant. These are, with a loose indication of time periods: legal personality as a sign for legal existence (17 th century) (part 2); the external aspect of legal personality and its structuring effect (18 th century) (part 3); legal personality as the flipside of the reified state (19 th century) (part 4); contestation of anthropomorphic conceptualisation of legal personality, and challenge of the closed doctrinal category of international legal persons (Interbellum) (part 5); legal personality turning from a constitutive to a declaratory legal statement (UN era) (part 6); and the potential impact on the legal personality concept of post-subject and posthuman lines of thought (from the 1990s) (part 7). While the following sections thus give a diachronical account of the concept of ILP, the identified moments in its development are also continuing and co-existing aspects of the concept. For example, while it is true that an intense concern for the state as the sole legal person in international law came to the fore in the second half of the 19 th century, the central position of the state is also an important element in the contemporary discourse on international legal personality.
Personality as presence in the law of nations
In the early 17 th century Grotius had worked with an idea of 'international' legal personhood in relation to both rulers and states, even if he did not use the term as such. 4 Hobbes on the other hand had famously defined the state as a 'person' constituted by contract, but as he negated the existence of a 'law of nature and nations', there had been no room for a concept of international legal personality. 5 Thus it was for Leibniz's universal (natural law) jurisprudence to introduce the concept into international law. 
Exaltation of the state person
Hobsbawm's 'long nineteenth century' is a fitting periodisation also when it comes to Generally only states were considered persons or subjects of international lawinfluential scholars such as Jellinek a priori dismissed the idea of personality for other entities-21 and the theorisation of 'legal personality' was impacted accordingly. The two main theoretical approaches to legal personality both proceeded from Hegel's understanding of the state as an actual, historically developed social reality. 22 Yet the first, marked by Hegel's organic thinking of the state, understood the concept of legal personality in organic or in (as, famously, Von Gierke in relation to the state) biological terms. 23 The second approach recognised as such the social reality of the entity to which legal personality was attributed, but conceived of 'legal personality' in fictional terms. unprotected by international law', and how later attribution of legal personality to the non-European world often appeared to serve the purpose of facilitating the transfer of title or the granting of concessions to the European world. 27
Contestation of the concept and expansion of the doctrinal category
Immediately after the Great War, international law scholarship was dominated by a sense of crisis. The concepts of sovereignty and personality, shaped by their sole wielder, the state, became a key site of political struggle. Many turned against the nineteenth century exaltation of the state and its 'absolute and uncontrolled' 28 sovereignty, for having contributed to the failure of the old international legal order. As the notion of legal personality became detached from the metaphysical identity of the state, the concept as such moved to the heart of the debate. Meanwhile, in doctrine the independence of the sovereign state -key element in its distinction from the manifold non-independent territorial arrangements in international law -came to be specifically showed great interest in the matter, but displayed "an extraordinary diversity of views on the subject." Anglo-Saxon scholars, on the other hand, "practically ignored" the debate. 45 Otherwise these were the years in which international concern for 'national minorities' was institutionalized, notably through the efforts of the League of Nations which set up a 'minorities protection system' 46 made up of commitments comprised in the various types of 'minorities treaties'. Minority groups did gain access to the protection mechanism via the petition system developed by the League in the early 1920s. 47 Whether in that period international 'rights' or only 'benefits' for minorities were at issue, is a matter of debate. 48 A broadly shared view is that minorities enjoyed some sort of 'protected status' but no 'legal personality'. Either way it is fair to say that in a broad sense the League has been a catalyst in the conceptualisation of legal personality for non-state entities, in particular minorities. 49 The League of Nations Mandate system brought former colonies of the defeated powers under the administration of mandatory powers such as the UK, France, and South Africa.
While the mandates were (implicitly) attributed a degree of international legal personality, 50 they were in many respects treated as colonies. This is also the period in which international organisations entered the international arena, their number rapidly growing in the years following the creation of the United Nations. The political struggle of IOs was different from that of individuals.
Organisations had an ambiguous role, in that they served as vehicles for state activity (a major factor in their success to begin with), and at the same time constituted a separate source of authority, increasingly competing with state actors.
The question of how to express this in formal-legal terms, which had been largely the new function of the legal personality concept, these categories were said to possess ILP 'to the extent that they carry rights and duties under international law'.
As a structuring concept 'legal personality' thus assumed a new role. Inferred from the apparent presence of concrete legal capacities, rights or duties which then serve as indicia, the concept has become an a posteriori predicate that helps us make sense of international law by mapping out who are -in one way or another -participants.
Generally speaking, the concept of 'legal personality' no longer works as a doctrinal barrier through a pre-set catalogue of legal persons, established on the basis of moral imperatives or political expediency. 58 That is to say -except when it comes to Non-Governmental Organisations. As yet the international community seems unanimously to adopt the barrier approach vis-à-vis NGOs, whatever signs of international-legal participation these may show. 59 For other actors, whether it be linked to the objective of protection or to that of accountability, the concept of legal personality is frequently invoked and doctrine tested: de facto regimes, armed ('opposition') groups, 'terrorists'. Likewise, several commentators have taken a pragmatic, inductive approach to multinational corporations, which are described as international legal persons to the degree they perform legally relevant acts in international practice; especially since the Ruggie reports the label of legal personality for MNCs has assumed a more abstract, mature dimension through the idea of their being bound by a catalogue of customary human rights.
Once international legal personality has been accorded to a (particular category of) actor, doctrinal reification occurs. Where the international legal personality of states, organisations, minorities and peoples is a given, social reality becomes the locus of contestation: is the entity really a state, is the group really a people, or a minority, or an indigenous people?
The fixed link between social and legal reality makes for complex identity politics, as when states do not recognise self-identified ethnic minorities within their borders; or when an entity presents itself as an 'international organisation', but claims not to have legal personality (the EU in its early years); or when an entity contrary to all appearances asserts it is not an international organisation and as a consequence does not have legal personality (this is, for now, the narrative of the OSCE). Conversely it is possible to start out with an (implicit) assertion of legal personality -for example by repeatedly performing legal acts, such as accession to a treaty -and therefrom proceed to claim the existence of a social fact; this appears to be the (effective) strategy of the emerging state of Palestine.
Post-subjectivity and the international legal person
From an immanent perspective, or 'in doctrine', the role of international legal personality as a declaratory predicate remains prevalent. At the level of theory, however, the concept is in motion. In recent years, postmodern philosophy of the subject has significantly impacted legal thought. One influential strand is the Foucauldian critique, which envisions the 'death' of the modern subject -that is the autonomous agent who knows herself and is distinct from power to the extent that she is able to confront it sovereignly. 60 Legal thinking is thus confronted with a move away from the creating subject (that is, the willful and acting subject generally taken as a starting point in legal thought on personality) to the postmodern constructed subject or self. For a lawyer the conception of the individual subject as a result of knowledge and power relations rather than as the wielder of power raises urgent questions, for one about accountability and responsibility.
The philosophical debate on (post)subjectivity has moreover triggered a renewed interest in the underpinning of legal personality, and ensuing attention for intersubjectivity and ethics in (international) legal thought. 61 The 'post-anthropocentric' perspective then has opened the legal imagination to the possibility of international legal personality for animals, 62 rivers 63 and ecosystems with a view to providing protection; and the 'posthuman' perspective has sensitized lawyers to the possibility of determining a point of attribution in networks, 64 and in cases of "autonomous machines'
decision making" 65 (such as armed robots), for the purpose of establishing legal accountability. How subjectivity critique may redefine legal personality in international law, will be an exciting question in legal scholarship in the coming years.
In positive international law, with the international legal system redefined over the past decades by international human rights law and international criminal law, the argument of the individual as the primary international legal person seemingly takes hold ever more firmly. 66 That said, the counter-position is consistently defended as well, drawing on profound doubt as to whether attribution of ILP at the expense of the state can be truly emancipatory. 67 If not the state, who or what will govern the individual? Global power structures of markets and corporations?
Legal personality is a structuring tool in international law, but its effects are complex.
Does an actor with ILP gain or loose independence? Is an actor without ILP disenfranchised or, rather, free from constraints? As for effectiveness, in the debate on multinational corporations it is frequently pointed out that (in its quality of a flexible predicate) legal personality for MNCs does not per se lead to more accountability. Some commentators see no use for the formal concept and look to concrete rights and obligations; others focus their attention on participants in international law rather than 'legal persons' (Higgins, Alvarez). 68 Questions of applied value aside, personality is the conceptual linchpin between the social and the legal, and as such cannot but be a central tool in claims of authority and autonomy among the participants in international life.
